

Intentions in Fourteenth-Century Bologna: Jandun, Alnwick, and the Mysterious “G”

ROBERTO LAMBERTINI*

Summary: The present paper discusses problems connected with the attribution of the anonymous disputed question *Utrum intentiones sint subiective in intellectu vel in rebus* (Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Ap., Vat. lat. 6768, ff. 201rA-202rA). It shows that Anneliese Maier’s hypotheses on this question should be abandoned and that the author is most probably neither John of Jandun nor William of Alnwick, but an arts master belonging to the intellectual *milieu* of the Bolognese University of Medicine and Arts in the first decades of the fourteenth century. As his identity cannot be ascertained beyond any doubt, I suggest that for now we add a “magister G” to the number of Bolognese masters already known for their adhesion to the modistic paradigm in the philosophy of logic.

In 1964 Anneliese Maier discovered how to decrypt the initials contained in a partial index of ms. Vat. lat. 6768, one of the most important witnesses of the philosophical activity at the University of Medicine and Arts in Bologna. Her discovery provided new, independent evidence concerning the intricate question of the attribution of many texts related to the so-called Bolognese Averroism and allowed her to confirm or discard several hypotheses formulated by Ermatinger and Kuksewicz (Maier 1964a). She almost had to admit defeat, however, when confronted with a *quaestio* bearing the title *Utrum intentiones sint subiective in intellectu vel in rebus* (Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Ap., Vat. lat. 6768, ff. 201rA-202rA according to the most recent numbering). As the corresponding part of the index is slightly damaged, Maier thought that today we can read only the last letter – a ‘G’ – of the initials which could have revealed the identity of the author of this *quaestio*. Unfortunately, the drafter of this index used two sets of initials in which

* I would like to thank all the persons whose kindness made the present paper possible, in particular Sten Ebbesen, Russell Friedman, Costantino Marmo, Andrea Tabarroni, and Annalisa Lambertini for their patience and their most valuable advice. I am sure that they will understand my wish to dedicate these pages to the memory of a great erudite student of the Bolognese University, Father Celestino Piana († 22.2.1992).

the last initial is 'G': 'J.G.' (meaning Johannes de Genduno) and 'fr. G.' (referring to frater Guillelmus, that is William of Alnwick, *alias* Guillelmus de Anglia or Anglicus). Alnwick or Jandun? Maier left the question open, although she admitted that she was inclined to think that Alnwick was the author.¹

The main purpose of the present paper is to test whether it is possible today, more than thirty years after Maier's discovery, to progress a little further and go beyond her dilemma.

1.

The second copy of the *quaestio*, which came to light some years ago in a very damaged fragment conserved in Pisa, Biblioteca del Seminario Arcivescovile S. Caterina, is of little help (De Robertis - Sturlese *et alii* 1980: 68-69). This second text is also anonymous and, when legible, it has a remarkable number of mistakes in common with the copy already known to Maier.

A little step forward can be made looking at the structure of the *quaestio*. This is, in fact, probably a *reportatio* of a disputed question since it lacks the refinements one would expect from an *ordinatio*. As usual, the text is divided into a *disputatio* and a *determinatio*. The first part summarizes a lively debate where, besides the *respondens* and the *arguentes*, also *quidam alii* and a master – who is not necessarily the same person who determined the *quaestio* in the following session² – take the floor. Even though we do not find the *bidellus* giving leave to speak to the *scholares* according to an order previously written on a *cedula* – as the University Statutes of Bologna would have prescribed – nevertheless the record of the debate follows a pattern which is not unusual in other Bolognese disputed questions.³

This Bolognese flavour becomes even stronger in the second part, which begins with a *declaratio terminorum* – a preliminary explanation of the meaning of all the terms appearing in the title of the question. Given the title *Utrum intentiones sint subiective in intel-*

1 Maier 1964a, in Maier 1967: 360: "Der Inhalt und vor allem der ganze Aufbau der Quaestio lassen die erstere Möglichkeit [i.e.: Alnwick] als die bei weitem wahrscheinlichere erscheinen".

2 As a matter of fact, at least two of the three *rationes* put forward *a magistro* find an answer in the concluding session.

3 Cf. Malagola 1888: 262; Tabarroni 1992; Lambertini 1992.

lectu vel in rebus, the first part of the *determinatio* deals preliminarily with the meaning of such terms as ‘*intentio*’, ‘*intentio secunda*’, ‘*intellectus*’, ‘*esse*’, ‘*in intellectu*’, ‘*in rebus*’.⁴ The presence of such an opening section of the *determinatio* – and not only of semantic specifications regarding key-words, which was a widespread habit – appears to be not just a sign of didacticism on the part of the master but also a distinctive feature of Bolognese disputed questions. Historians of medicine such as Danielle Jacquart were among the first to notice this peculiarity (Jacquart 1985: 297-309; in general about the Bolognese University of Medicine and Arts see Maierù 1994). After an almost complete examination of the material available, I cannot say that every Bolognese disputed question contains a *declaratio* or *expositio terminorum*, but I can indeed confirm that this feature is rather frequent and is seen by the Bolognese masters as a usual and integral part of their *determinationes* (Lambertini 1992).⁵ For example, in the questions on Aristotle’s *De anima* attributed to Matthaeus de Eugubio (Ghisalberti 1981; on difficulties of the attribution see Piana 1948, Alichniewicz 1986, Lambertini 1992) the eighth item, which strongly resembles a *determinatio* of a disputed question, has a *declaratio terminorum* which is quite similar to the one contained in our anonymous text. In particular, it shows the same attention to almost all the terms included in the title:

... quantum ad primum, termini quaestionis sunt sex: intellectus noster in nobis existens intelligat separata a materia quidditative. <Intellectus>; secundus terminus: intellectus noster; est in nobis existens: tertius terminus; intelligat: quartus; separata a materia: quintus; quidditative: sextus terminus. (M. de Eugubio(?), *Quaest. de Anima*, III, q. 8: 206).⁶

Thaddaeus de Parma has a liking for this kind of preliminary explanation as well, e.g. in his *Utrum genus predicetur per se de differentia*:

4 Anon., *Utrum intentiones...*: 201rB: “Circa primum sciendum quod termini questionis sunt VI, scilicet: intentio, intentio secunda, <intellectus>, sit, in intellectu, uel in rebus.”

5 For one – to my knowledge rare – example of *declaratio terminorum* outside Bologna, cf. Guillelmus de Ockham, *Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum (reportatio)*, qq. 10-11: 194.

6 The addition between brackets is mine.

... termini positi in questionis titulo dicuntur esse tres: genus; secundus: differentia; tertius: predicari per se (Th. de Parma, *Utrum genus predicetur...*: 231rB)

The case for the connection of our anonymous text to Bologna is also strengthened by the fact that, in codex Vat. lat. 6768, our anonymous *quaestio* belongs to a quire which contains exclusively disputed questions by Bolognese arts masters, such as Matthaeus de Eugubio, Thaddaeus de Parma, and Angelus de Aretio.⁷ The situation of the Pisan fragment is very similar, as all other texts contained there are of Bolognese origin.⁸

If it is highly probable that a disputed question containing such a *declaratio terminorum* was held in Bologna, then Maier's dilemma seems to fade away. As far as we know – despite the influence he exerted on authors such as Thaddaeus de Parma (Vanni Rovighi 1951) – Jandun had never been in Italy before his ill-fated descent to Rome together with the German emperor, during which it is difficult to imagine that he could have had time to make any sort of lecturing *tournée*. His most accurate biography would rather suggest the contrary (Schmugge 1966: 26-38).

The elimination of Jandun as the author is corroborated by the doctrinal contents of the *quaestio*. When the anonymous author of this *quaestio* defines *intentio*, he speaks in fact of a *cognitio*, or *ratio intelligendi*, taken from the *apparens* of the cognized thing. In another passage, *apparens* and *modus essendi* are used synonymously. Now, it is well known that Jandun was acquainted with an account of human knowledge founded on *modi essendi*, but rejected it,⁹ as, for example, in the following text:

7 Cf. De Mottoni - Luna 1987: 218.

8 It is interesting to note that three disputed questions totally or partially preserved in the Pisan fragment – *Utrum intentiones secundae...*, *Utrum conceptus speciei in sui essentia et formaliter sit compositus vel simplex*, and *Per quem modum habeat fieri ordo predicamentalis* – follow one another according to the same order in which they appear in Vat. lat. 6768; cf. Maier 1964a in Maier 1967: 360. The fragmentary text which appears at the beginning of the Pisan manuscript and bears the subscription “Explicit quaestio per magistrum Angelum (corr. in: ‘nescio’) disputata” is the conclusion of the *quaestio Utrum quantitas sit principium individuationis* which, in Vat. lat. 6768, ff. 229rA-B, is attributed to Angelus de Aretio.

9 See also Pinborg 1975a; Joh. de Jand., *Quaest. in Met.*, VI, q. 9: 84H: “Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut communiter dicitur quedam entia rationis sunt prime intentiones, alia sunt secunde intentiones; et dicunt quod prima intentio est prima intellectio rei que accipitur a proprio modo essendi, ut si intelligitur animal intellectuione

... notandum quod ipsi ponunt genus, differentiam et speciem importare eandem materiam et formam, tamen dicunt quod hoc est sub diversis rationibus quae accipiuntur a diuersis modis essendi et apparentibus; unde dicunt quod alia est ratio qua animal significat istam naturam et alia est ratio qua rationale significat eandem naturam, quia ratio animalis communior est quam ratio rationalis, cum ista accipitur a modo essendi communiori, ut a sentire, et ratio rationalis accipitur a modo essendi, scilicet ratiocinari, qui est specialior...

Notandum quod licet ista opinio sit communis, tamen non stat cum principiis eorum. (Joh. de Jand., *Quaest. in Met.*, l. III, q. 12: 41K-O).

2.

Is "G." really William of Alnwick? His activity in Bologna as a *lector* is one of the few concrete facts of his biography (Piana 1982, Dumont 1987, Alliney 1993). A manuscript (Firenze, Bibl. Med. Laur., S. Croce, Plut. XXXI, dext. 8) has the following attribution in the upper margin of f. 79v: "Questiones magistri Guilelmi Amoyc Anglici lectoris bononie usque ad finem." In 1321 he was asked to give his *consilium* in the context of a heresy trial conducted in Bologna against two members of the Este family who were successfully resisting John XXII's allies in Ferrara (Bock 1937). Alnwick found them guilty of heresy. In 1323, however, the same John XXII complained that a certain "Guillelmus dictus Anglicus ordinis fratrum Minorum" preached in front of the Bolognese clergy and people claiming that it was heretical to deny the absolute poverty of Christ and the Apostles.¹⁰ Another codex (Città del

quae accipitur a sentire, quod ibi proprium est, tunc est prima intentio. Sed secunda intentio est intellectio rei quae accipitur a modo essendi communi, ut si intelligitur animal ut habet esse in pluribus, quia hoc est sibi commune et aliis et plante et colori. Et sic est secunda intentio; tamen melius est, ut uisum fuit prius, quod intentiones rerum capiantur a quidditate rerum ut uult Lyncolniensis primo Post."

¹⁰ See Eubel 1898: 259; Piana 1970; Piana 1986: 106-107; Ledoux 1937: XII-XIII suggested that the *determinatio* on the evangelical counsels (*Utrum consilia euangelica includant perfectionem*) contained in Firenze, Bibl. Med. Laur., Plut. XXXI dext. 8, 80vA-82vB and 62rA-vB could have been the occasion of the papal reaction. It is worth noting, however, that in this text Alnwick attacks Godfrey of Fontaines (f. 82vB) and one passage seems to refer to a period of time anteceding John XXII's *Quia nonnumquam* (1322) which lifted the ban on discussions regarding Nicholas III's *Exiit qui seminat*: "... et caueant sibi qui detrahunt paupertati aut statui fratrum minorum publice aut occulte quia excommunicati sunt omnes, quia uerba predicta ipsius decretalis [i.e. *Exiit*] deprauant uel aliter exponunt quam sonant a qua sententia per neminem nisi per romanum pontificem possunt absolui, ut habetur in fine ipsius decretalis; sic ergo patet quod consilium paupertatis perfectionem importet." (f. 82vA).

Vaticano, Bibl. Ap., Ottob. lat. 318: 42vA and 50vB) witnesses explicitly that at least two disputed questions by Alnwick (that is *Utrum una et eadem relatione numero possit aliquid referri ad duos terminos* and *Utrum asserere mundum fuisse ab aeterno fuerit de intentione Aristotelis*; cf. Maier 1944) were held in Bologna. Most manuscripts containing some of Alnwick's *determinationes* also preserve copies of texts by Bolognese authors.¹¹ Such evidence convinced many scholars that many, if not all *determinationes* by Alnwick are the result of his Bolognese activity (Maier 1949; Kuksewicz 1966; but see also Stella 1968 and Alichniewicz 1992).

In suggesting that Alnwick could be the author of the anonymous *quaestio* which forms the object of the present paper, Aneliese Maier did not limit herself to the fact that the Franciscan theologian had taught in Bologna. She based her opinion mainly on a structural similarity between Alnwick's *determinationes* and our text. More precisely, she observed that they shared not only a lively dispute in the first part, but also the opening formula of the *modus procedendi*, namely: "In ista questione sic procedam ...". Maier's argument is far from conclusive, and in fact appears weak considering that most of Alnwick's texts known as *determinationes* contain only the determination of the *quaestio* and omit the report of the *disputatio*, even though they often presuppose a foregoing public discussion.¹² Moreover, if the Franciscan theologian had a preferred formula for introducing his solution of a *quaestio*, this was rather "Circa solutionem/In solutione istius questionis sic procedam" (see Ledoux 1937: XX-XLVI), while our anonymous question uses an impersonal "In ista questione sic est procedendum" (201rB). As a matter of fact, Alnwick's texts have been transmitted in different versions and different literary shapes, as Maier was well aware. Some of them are surely *reportationes*, while others bear clear signs of a careful editing by the author (Stella 1968; Piana 1982). In Ottob. lat. 318 Maier thought she found a *repetitio* of

¹¹ Besides more famous manuscripts, such as Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Ap., Ottob. lat. 318, Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Ap., Vat. lat. 6768, and Firenze, Bibl. Naz., Conv. Soppr., J. III. 6, also Oxford, Bodl. Lib., Can. Misc. 226 deserves further examination from this point of view.

¹² For examples of Alnwick's texts that also include the *disputatio*, cf. Prezioso 1962; but also *Utrum in maiori quantitate continua sint plures partes in potentia quam in minori* (slightly different versions in Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Ap., Pal. lat. 1805 and Vat. lat. 6768, but also in Oxford, Bodl. Lib., Can. Misc. 226).

a *quaestio* by Alnwick (but see Stella 1968). On the other hand, some questions, like the ones published by Kuksewicz (1966; see also Veliath 1970), reveal the attempt to make into three distinct *determinationes* material which could, at least in part, derive from the same disputation; at the same time, in the written version Alnwick broaches a broad set of problems, which most likely exceeds the limits of an actual *disputatio*. In the face of such a textual tradition, where different levels of editing coexist, structural and stylistic comparisons can hardly go beyond “impressionistic” remarks. While waiting for a critical edition (Leonardi 1994: 11), which could be of great help also in this respect, I must limit myself to observing that, while Maier pointed at rather vague similarities, there is one striking structural difference between Alnwick’s *Determinationes* and our *quaestio*: the English Franciscan never uses an *expositio terminorum* similar to those we can find in Bolognese questions. The preceding observations cannot of course be used as an argument *against* Alnwick’s authorship; they merely show that stylistic features do not necessarily militate in its favour.

Without expanding on the subject, Maier clearly stated that the contents of the *quaestio* pointed rather to Alnwick than to Jandun (Maier 1964 in Maier 1967: 360). Although doctrinal comparisons are often inconclusive, we can move to a sketchy outline of the positions put forward in the *quaestio*. In the *disputatio* the *respondens* holds that second intentions are *subiective in intellectu* and *obiective in rebus*. Against an interpretation of the equally famous and obscure Avicennian saying that logic is *de intentionibus secundis adiunctis primis*, he argues that a first intention is not to be identified with the thing itself but with the thing as far as it is understood.¹³ This statement is questioned by the *magister*, who insists that one cannot find the *intentio* on the *res intellecta*, because the latter is already a compound consisting of thing and intention. Then he criticizes the idea of an objective existence of intentions in things. The *magister* is then attacked by *quidam alii* who maintain that intentions do exist in things and not in the intellect.

13 Anon., *Utrum intentiones...*: 201rA: “... ista ratio ymaginatur quod intentiones prime sint ipse res prout absolute et ut sic in ipsis fundentur intentiones secunde; sed hoc non est uerum, quia intentiones secunde fundantur solum in rebus intellectis ut intellecte sunt et non in rebus absolute acceptis.”

The reader could think that the *determinatio* would end just like many more famous texts, namely with the answer that intentions exist from one perspective in the things, but from another point of view they are in the intellect.¹⁴ The anonymous author of the *quaestio* explicitly dismisses this kind of solution, which he thinks begs the question, and maintains that second intentions exist *subiective in intellectu*.¹⁵ Properly speaking, an *intentio secunda* is a *ratio intelligendi* which is founded on an *apparens commune*, or *modus essendi communis* of the thing known and results from a reflexive activity of the intellect.¹⁶ From an ontological point of view, an intention is nothing other than an accident of the intellect. More precisely, since the expression *intentio* should always be understood as “*in aliud tentio*”, it is an *accidens respectivum*.¹⁷ The possibility that intentions exist *obiective* in the intellect is not even taken into consideration, although the *declaratio terminorum* includes an explanation of the phrase “*esse obiective in intellectu*”.

At any rate, the *determinatio* does not expand upon the relationship existing between second intentions and things. Our anonymous author remarks that intentions exist in the *res* only potentially, not *in actu*, so that they can be said to have *originaliter esse in rebus*.¹⁸ After stating that there is some kind of link to extramental

14 See, e.g., Radulphus Brito in Ebbesen 1978, Pinborg 1975b and 1980: 112-121.

15 Anon., *Utrum intentiones...*: 201vA: “Hiis uisus moueantur dubitationes quedam, et primo quia posset aliquis dicere: totum illud quod dictum est nihil ualet, quia dicam quod intentio potest accipi dupliciter, uno modo ex parte intellectus, alio modo ex parte rei intellecte: primo modo dicam quod sunt in intellectu subiective, sed alio modo sunt in rebus, quia sunt ut sic habitudines consequentes rem ipsam, quare etc. Ad quod dicendum breuiter quod illa ratio petit principium, nam illud quod est dictum est eque dubium sicut principale quesitum ...”

16 Anon., *Utrum intentiones...*: 201rB: “Ad euidentiam secundi est sciendum quod intentio est duplex, scilicet prima et secunda, prima intentio est prima cognitio rei sumpta ab apparenti proprio rei; sed intentio secunda est ratio intelligendi rei sumpta ab apparenti communi rei et iste duo intentiones conueniunt in uno et differunt in pluribus. Conueniunt in uno quia utraque habet esse spirituale in intellectu, sed differunt: primo nam intentio prima sumitur ab apparenti proprio, sed secunda sumitur ab apparenti communi.”

17 Anon., *Utrum intentiones...*: 202rA.

18 Anon., *Utrum intentiones...*: 202rB: “Ad euidentiam quarti est intelligendum quod intentiones habent duplex esse: scilicet <unum est in> actu, et tale est in intellectu; aliud est in potentia et originaliter et tale est in re. Modo questio querit utrum intentiones quo ad eorum esse in actu sint in re uel in intellectu. Tantum de isto.”

things, his primary concern seems to be to show that second intentions exist only in the intellect as accidents in their subject. Logic as a science is therefore posterior to the other sciences, which deal with real extramental things.

Could Alnwick have held such a position concerning intentions? So far, in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, in his *Quaestiones de ente intelligibili*, in his *Determinationes*, I have been unable to find a text where Alnwick directly broaches and discusses thoroughly the subject of the *quaestio*. In the Assisi version of his *Commentary on the Sentences*, however, the universal taken as a second intention is defined in the following terms: “respectus rationis consequens operationem intellectus”; in the same context, the *res prime intentionis* is equated with the *quidditas*.¹⁹ In a passage of an unedited *determinatio*, Alnwick criticizes the position of those who admit the existence of a *distinctio secundum intentionem* which would differ both from a *distinctio secundum rem* and a *distinctio secundum rationem*. On this occasion, he briefly sketches his own understanding of intentions. Names of first intention, such as *homo*, *leo*, signify the natures of extramental things. They are called *intentiones* because they result from nature’s intention: “agens enim naturale intendit naturam suam communicare producendo sibi simile”. Such *intentiones* then form the basis for second intentions, which are produced by the intellect – as Alnwick writes echoing Scotus (Tachau 1988: 64) – “circa rem primae intentionis”.²⁰ In his *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili*, things of first intention are equated with real extramental things, while *res secundae intentionis* are nothing other than *entia rationis* (Guil. Alnwick *Quaest. de esse intelligibili*, q. 2: 43; cf. also Dumont 1987: 63). Alnwick’s texts quoted so far are not exactly comparable with our anonymous question, since the Franciscan theologian is speaking of *res* either of first or second intentions, and not of intentions in themselves. At a glance, however, the reader is struck by the fact that Alnwick uses a terminology which is different from the one which can be found in our anonymous question. Although he would probably have agreed with the conclusion of the *quaestio*, i.e. that second intentions are *subiective*

19 Guil. Alnwick, *Quaest. in lib. Sent.*, I, q. 11, *Utrum sit necesse ponere species intelligibiles impressas in memoria preter speciem que est in fantasia*, Assisi, Bibl. Com., 172, f. 48v. On this ms. see Doucet 1932, Dumont 1987.

20 Guil. Alnwick, *Utrum quaecumque sunt distincta ex natura rei sint distincta realiter*, Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Ap., Pal. lat. 1805, f. 114r.

in the intellect, in his account he does not use expressions such as “*prima cognitio*”, “*ratio intelligendi*”, “*apparens proprium*”, “*apparens commune*”, “*modus essendi*”. Moreover, in one passage of the question *Utrum ratione naturali possit evidentiter ostendi quod anima intellectiva sit forma corporis humani*, Alnwick seems to imply that first intentions do exist *subiective et formaliter* in the extramental thing:

... nulla potentia organica, que est sensitiva, est cognitiva relationis rationis, nec secundarum intentionum, quia potentia sensitiva et organica non movetur nisi ab intentione, que est in re subiective ex natura rei, non enim fabricat suum obiectum primum nec secundarium. Non est autem relatio rationis nec aliqua intentio secunda in re subiective et formaliter, tunc enim esset intentio prima ... (Guil. Alnwick, *Utrum ratione naturali...*: 28)

Now, although the author of our anonymous *quaestio* is primarily concerned with the status of second intentions, he suggests that all intentions, first and second ones, have an *esse spirituale in intellectu*:

Ad euidenciam secundi est sciendum quod intentio est duplex, scilicet prima et secunda, prima intentio est prima cognitio rei sumpta ab apparenti proprio rei; sed intentio secunda est ratio intelligendi rei sumpta ab apparenti communi rei; et iste duo intentiones conueniunt in uno et differunt in pluribus. Conueniunt in uno, quia utraque habet esse spirituale in intellectu, sed differunt ... (Anon., *Utrum intentiones...*: 201rB)

Elsewhere in our anonymous *quaestio*, *intentiones* are said to exist only *in potentia* in extramental things. In addition, in one *ratio* which he introduces in favour of his conclusion, the author presents the assumption that “*intentio prima est in re*” as leading to absurd consequences.²¹ Finally, it seems unlikely that, defining first intentions as “*prima cognitio rei*”, he would assume without any qualification that they exist in the extramental things.

The contrast between these two accounts of the nature of first intentions can be symbolically summarized in the two etymologies they propose for the word ‘*intentio*’: in our anonymous *quaestio* (201rB) it is “*intentio, quasi in aliud tentio*” (as an act of the intellect), while in *Utrum quaecumque sunt distincta ex natura rei sint distincta realiter* (114r) Alnwick says “*et ideo dicuntur intentiones, quia a natura intenduntur*”. In a famous passage of his *Ordinatio*, Scotus pointed out that ‘*intentio*’ was an equivocal term. The texts we are

²¹ Anon., *Utrum intentiones secunde...*: 201vA: “*si intentio prima esset in re, sequeretur quod idem esset in actu et in potentia.*”

comparing seem to use this word in two different senses which the Subtle Doctor himself had recognized as possible meanings of ‘*intentio*’. In our anonymous question, *intentio*, no matter whether first or second, is equated with a concept, or at least with a mental construct, while Alnwick seems to understand first intentions rather as a ‘formal reason’ of the thing known (cf. Tachau 1988: 62).

Scholars are well aware of the fact that overall consistency is not always the primary concern of medieval authors, particularly when they approach problems from different points of view or in different literary contexts. Even if such divergent approaches to the nature of *intentiones* cannot therefore absolutely rule out Alnwick’s authorship, they certainly do not support Maier’s impression of a doctrinal affinity between the positions held by the Franciscan theologian and the author of our anonymous question. Another clue contained in the *declaratio terminorum* raises more serious doubts about the attribution to Alnwick. In his attempt to clarify the terms of the question, our anonymous author also gives a definition of *intellectus*. Distinguishing between *intellectus agens* and *intellectus possibilis* he touches upon an issue which was also intensively debated in Bologna in the first half of the XIV century (Kuksewicz 1968, Vanni Rovighi 1969). Understandably, he does not expand on the subject, which is not directly pertinent to the issue at hand, and limits himself to rather generic information. The agent and possible intellect are both immaterial powers, essential to human knowledge as an active and a passive principle. The agent intellect presides over abstraction, while the passive intellect is the recipient of the products of such abstraction. At least *prima facie*, such statements do not exceed the limits of an elementary exposition of Aristotelian psychology. The account of the proper operation of the *intellectus possibilis* – described as knowledge of the separate substances to be attained at the end of this life – has, however, a strong “Averroistic” flavour.²² This position

²² *Ibidem*: 201rB: “Ad euidenciam tertii est intelligendum quod intellectus est duplex, scilicet agens et possibilis. Intellectus agens est uirtus quedam actiua cuius proprium est separare quidditatem a principiis indiuiduantibus; sed intellectus possibilis est uirtus quedam cuius proprium est abstracta recipere Secundo differunt quia operatio intellectus agentis est perfectior operatione intellectus possibilis: nam intellectus agens habet intelligere substantias separatas et non intelligit aliquid eorum que sunt hic, sed operatio intellectus possibilis est intelligere substantias separatas solum in fine uite secundum Commentatorem.”

implies, in fact, the possibility of a natural, unlimited access of our cognitive powers to the knowledge of separate substances. Based on Averroes' *Commentarium Magnum* on Book III of *De anima* (comm. 36), such a doctrine found explicit support among the Bolognese arts masters known for their sympathies towards "Averroistic" theories, for example in Jacobus de Placentia's *Commentary on De anima*.²³

Now, Alnwick's engagement against some basic tenets of Averroes' interpretation of Aristotle is well known. He dealt with Averroes' psychological doctrines especially in three questions edited by Kuksewicz. In one of them, bearing the title *Utrum ratione naturali possit evidenter ostendi quod anima intellectiva sit forma corporis humani*, Alnwick not only attacks the pillars of "Averroistic" psychology, but he also explicitly rejects the interpretation of the role of the intellect which is accepted by our anonymous master.

... operatio intellectus possibilis est intelligere substantias separatas solum in fine uite secundum Commentatorem. (Anon., *Utrum intentiones...*: 201rB)

Secundum etiam inconveniens non sequitur, sed eque concludit contra Commentatorem: ipse enim **figit** [the emphasis is mine], quod cum intellectus possibilis fuerit in dispositione adeptionis, tunc perfecte intelligit se et substantias separatas, et tamen illa intellectio non est eadem cum intellectu, quia illa intellectio est nova, nec semper infuit, immo si acquiritur, in fine quasi dierum hominis acquiritur, in illa tamen intellectione intelligens et intellectum sunt idem. (Guill. Alnwick, *Utrum ratione naturali...*: 22)

Although this text is not taken from Alnwick's proper *responsio*, but rather from his preceding discussion of different opinions, the contrast is indeed striking. It would seem at least odd that a theologian who was so deeply involved in a polemic against "Averroistic" psychology would use such a formula to describe the operation of the possible intellect, even in a context where the doctrine of the intellect was not at stake. After all, in another question he dismisses the same doctrine as a *finctio*: why should he adopt it here without any comment or specification? Alnwick's dissent from Averroes' gnoseology and psychology is a constant throughout his works. In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, prol., q. 7, *Utrum*

²³ J. de Placentia, *Lectura cum quaestionibus super Tertium de Anima*, q. 11: 116-117; *ad textum Averrois comm.* 4: 191. Cf. also M. de Eugubio(?), *Quaestiones De Anima*, l. III, q. 3: 178.

possibile sit intellectum nostrum coniunctum cognoscere de Deo quid est per creaturas, although defending against Aquinas some arguments put forward by Averroes, Alnwick still maintains that human knowledge of God is not adequate to its object (Bassi 1993). Furthermore, the Assisi version of his *Commentary on the Sentences* contains a question devoted to gnoseological issues, bearing the title *Utrum intellectus agens sit aliquid ipsius ymaginis vel alicuius partis eius*. Here Alnwick, dismissing Averroes' *opinio* as *erronea*, maintains that the possible and agent intellect are the same intellectual power seen *sub diversis respectibus* and distinguishes between two "agent intellects": "Dico igitur quod est intellectus agens connaturalis ipsi anime, et alius separatus, scil. Deus. Primus pertinet ad ymaginem in quantum est connaturalis potentia ipsius anime concurrens ad actum intelligendi eliciendum."²⁴ Such a position seems difficult to reconcile with the gnoseology of our anonymous question even given its sketchiness. A similar attitude towards Averroes emerges also in Alnwick's Oxford *Quodlibet*, where the 5th question bears the title *Utrum homo possit consequi omnem beatitudinem per naturam quam naturaliter appetit*. After examining Aristotle's and Averroes' positions here, Alnwick denies that men can reach the ultimate knowledge of God they are longing for through the exercise of speculative sciences (Guil. Alnwick, *Quaest. de quodlibet*, q. 5: 339-347).

The doubts raised by a study of the theory of *intentiones* are therefore only strengthened when one moves to psychological issues; the reasons for calling an attribution to Alnwick into doubt are at least as strong as those which exclude Jandun's authorship.

3.

If we go beyond Maier's alternative between Jandun and Alnwick, a Bolognese arts master is clearly the best candidate. Besides the formal features of the *quaestio*, which – as we have seen above – point to the Bolognese milieu, also the terminology adopted in our *quaestio* to describe the nature of *intentiones* is consistent with that found in works by masters such as Gentilis de Cingulo, An-

²⁴ Assisi, Bibl. Com. 172: 51r. That *intellectus possibilis* and *agens* are the same power is a position also championed in *Utrum intellectus agens sit substantia separata*, Firenze, Bibl. Med. Laur., S. Croce, Plut. XXXI, dext. 8, 79vA-80rB.

gelus de Aretio, Thaddaeus de Parma, Matthaëus de Eugubio, Jacobus de Placentia (Lambertini 1989a, 1992). Intentions are in fact described as *cognitiones* or *rationes intelligendi* which the intellect “derives” from *modi essendi* or *apparentia* of extramental things. Moreover, the difference between first and second intentions is traced back to a distinction between *apparentia propria* and *communis*. This terminology is highly reminiscent of what we can call the “modist paradigm”, which was widely accepted at the Bolognese University of Medicine and Arts up to the fourth/fifth decade of the XIVth century (Maierù 1992; Lambertini 1992; Marmo 1994; De Libera 1996: 283-304). After all, the blend of a “modistic” approach to logic and an “Averroistic” psychology is one of the most typical features of the philosophers active in Bologna in those years.

If style, terminology, and doctrine all point to the common background of the Bolognese University of Medicine and Arts in the first decades of the XIVth century, the very fact that such features were shared by many authors makes it extremely difficult to progress towards a more precise attribution. Some basic doctrines, such as a “modistic” theory of intentions, are in fact accepted by almost all members of the group, who differ from one another only with respect to some details. On the other hand, it is well known that some of these masters, such as Matthaëus, tend to change terminology – if not opinion – from one work to another (Rossi 1992). Given our present knowledge it can only be ascertained that the position about intentions held in the *quaestio* is not incompatible with the theories supported by most of the Bolognese arts masters, while the point of view and the terminology adopted do not match exactly the works of any master known to me. At best one can tentatively exclude some possible authors on the basis of some evidence which is, however, far from being conclusive. Some provisional, negative results can be obtained for example using, instead of the theory of intentions, the doctrine of the role of the agent intellect in the cognitive process as a “test case”. The author of our anonymous *quaestio* writes: “Intellectus agens est virtus quedam activa cuius proprium est separare quiditatem a principiis individuantibus” (201rB). As the debate on this issue among the Bolognese arts masters was very detailed and they distinguished with great precision among positions differing only slightly, we are most probably entitled to interpret such a succinct

statement as taking a stand in the Bolognese discussion about the actual function of the agent intellect. Now, Thaddaeus de Parma, Matthaeus de Eugubio, Jacobus de Placentia, and Anselmus de Cumis are acquainted with an *opinio* maintaining (in Thaddaeus' wording) that "intellectus agens ... removet quiditatem a conditionibus individuantes" or, according to Matthaeus, that "intellectus agens ponitur propter separare quiditatem a conditionibus materialibus". Jacobus de Placentia speaks of "separare quiditatem a conditionibus individuantes"; Anselmus de Cumis has "denudare quiditatem a conditionibus individuantes".²⁵ All these masters, however, agree in rejecting such an explanation of the role of the agent intellect – an explanation that can be traced back, as Vanni Rovighi (1951) pointed out, to Godfrey of Fontaines (*Quodlibet* V, q. 10: 35-40). The available texts do not allow us to establish whether the Bolognese *magistri* had in mind one of their colleagues defending such a view or were simply referring to the opinion of the famous Parisian master. At any rate, by choosing the wording "separare quiditatem a principiis individuantes" the author of our anonymous question parts company with some of the best known exponents of the Bolognese University of Medicine and Arts.²⁶

It seems, then, that we abandoned Maier's dilemma just to end up in a quandary again. As doctrinal evidence seems not to facilitate, but to make even more difficult the task of identifying the author of our question, one can be tempted to focus exclusively on the clue offered by the letter "G." In fact, the problems arising from an attribution either to Alnwick or to Jandun do not necessarily imply that the author of the index relied on false information, although this is of course possible.²⁷ Moreover, Maier's interpretation of "G." could be wrong. One can suppose that the origi-

25 Th. de Parma, *Quaestiones in tertium de Anima*, q. 15: 140; Matthaeus de Eugubio, *Utrum sit dare intellectum agentem vel propter quid ponatur, si ponitur*: 305; Anselmus de Cumis, *Utrum abstractio fantasmatum ab intellectu agente sit aliquid aut nichil*: 86; Jacobus de Placentia, *Lectura cum quaest. super III De anima*, q. 6: 87.

26 Alnwick also rejects the opinion that abstraction *circa fantasmata* represents the function proper to the agent intellect, cf. *Quaest. in libros Sent.*, I, q. 12, Assisi, Bibl. Com. 172: 49v.

27 The author of the index has proved to lack some information – it has proven possible to identify the author of texts he left anonymous (Ebbesen 1978; Tabaroni 1992) – but not to give wrong attributions.

nal initials were neither 'J. G.' nor 'fr. G.', but maybe 'M. G.' or even a simple 'G.' As a matter of fact, elsewhere the index has analogous initials, e.g. 'M. a.', signifying Angelus de Aretio, and 'M.', meaning Matthaëus de Eugubio. In such a case, Gentilis de Cingulo would be the most likely candidate. Unfortunately, a comparison with Gentilis' works does not lead to unequivocal results. The master from Cingoli does use *apparens* as a synonym for *proprietas* or *operatio* (meaning the feature of the cognized thing from which the intellect derives intentions) but never adopts the opposition between *apparens proprium* and *apparens commune*.²⁸ Instead of that, he prefers speaking of essential and not-essential *proprietates*, on which the intellect finds respectively first and second intentions.²⁹ We reach a similar stalemate trying to compare gnoseological terminology. Gentilis describes the activity of the intellect as an *abstractio* "a principiis individuantibus" like our anonymous author does, but this clue is too vague, since he never goes into details concerning the nature and function of *intellectus possibilis* and *agens*.³⁰

This lack of precise terminological agreement between Gentilis and our anonymous author, although not decisive from a theoretical point of view, does not allow us to confirm an attribution which could be suggested by that "G." Furthermore, we cannot ignore the fact that other, less famous Bolognese masters also have names that begin with this letter. In archival sources, Zilfredus de Placentia is sometimes called also Gilfredus, while among the masters whose works are still unknown to us we can find at least a Guillelmus de Dexara, a Galvanus de Reggio, and a Gerardus de Parma (Tabarroni 1992: 419-423).

28 See Gentilis de Cingulo, *Scriptum super Porphyrium*, lectio 1, Firenze, Bibl. Naz. Centr., Conv. Soppr. J.X.30, 1vB; Idem, *Commentum super quinque predicabilibus seu universalibus*, Firenze, Bibl. Med. Laur., Strozz. 99, 44r ff.; Idem, *Questiones Porphyrii*, q. 7, Palermo, Bibl. Com., 2 Qq. D. 142, 76rB-77rB (on this ms. see Tabarroni 1992). On Gentilis' theory of intentions Lambertini 1989a and Lambertini 1990.

29 Gentilis de Cingulo, *Commentum super quinque predicabilibus seu universalibus*, Firenze, Bibl. Med. Laur., Strozz. 99: 43r: "Sed gratia exempli uniuersale quod est secunda intentio est modus intelligendi rem aliquam sub aliqua posteriori proprietate reperta in illa, que proprietas non est essentialis illi rei in qua reperitur..."

30 *Ibidem*: 44r: "... si nos intelligimus essenciam hominis abstractam per intellectum a principiis indiuiduantibus". But cf. idem, *Scriptum super Porphyrium*, lectio 1, Firenze, Bibl. Naz. Centr., Conv. Soppr. J. X.30: 2vB: "Sed tu dices: in quo ergo intellectu habent esse talia uniuersalia? dicendum quod in intellectu hominum particularium, postquam iam sunt perfecte uirtutes deseruientes intellectui."

Conclusion

More than thirty years after Maier's ground-breaking article, the attempt to unveil the identity of the author of the disputed question *Utrum intentiones sint subiective in intellectu* contained in Vat. lat. 6768 is not yet rewarded with success. Research is no longer limited to an alternative between two thinkers, but is confronted with a wider range of possibilities. This apparent regression, however, is balanced by the fact that an increased knowledge of the Bolognese intellectual environment allows us to locate the author with much more plausibility in the *milieu* of the Bolognese University of Medicine and Arts in the first decades of the fourteenth century.

A comparison with some of Alnwick's positions revealed that this Franciscan theologian active in Bologna supported a theory of intentions which was different from the one championed by the Bolognese masters. The disagreement between them and Alnwick in this field, however, was by no means as radical as the well-known clash between their respective opinions with regard to Averroes' interpretation of Aristotle.

Although identifying the anonymous author of the *quaestio* with Gentilis de Cingulo could be tempting, the available evidence is not sufficient to attribute the text to any particular figure. For this reason I would suggest that we designate the anonymous author as "magister G." for the time being. Now, however, we can study our anonymous question not only as a witness to the Bolognese teaching activity, but we can also regard "magister G." as an exponent of the Bolognese "modism". As a matter of fact, siding with other Bolognese masters such as Matthaëus de Eugubio in his critique of Hervæus Natalis' theories (Lambertini 1989a), "magister G." did not rely on the notion of objective existence of intentions in order to clarify the ontological status of the object of logic. His account of the nature of intentions rested indeed uniquely on the interaction of extramental entities and accidental modifications which exist *subiective* in the intellect. The same basic attitude towards logic was shared by the "main stream" of the Bolognese tradition in the first decades of the XIVth century.

Bibliography

Primary Literature

- Anonymus, *Utrum intentiones sint subiective in intellectu vel in rebus*, Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Ap., Vat. lat. 6768: 201rA-202rA.
- Anselmus de Cumis, *Utrum abstractio fantasmatum ab intellectu agente sit aliquid aut nichil*, in Kuksewicz 1965: 81-91.
- Gentilis de Cingulo, *Commentum super quinque predicabilibus seu universalibus*, Firenze, Bibl. Med. Laur., Strozz. 99: 43r-46v.
- Gentilis de Cingulo, *Questiones Porphyrii*, Palermo, Bibl. Com., 2 Qq. D. 142: 74rA-77vB.
- Gentilis de Cingulo, *Scriptum super Porphyrium*, Firenze, Bibl. Naz. Centr., Conv. Soppr. J.X.30: 1rA-16vA.
- Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quintum quodlibetum*. in *Les Quodlibet Cinq, Six et Sept de Godefroid de Fontaines*, edd. M. De Wulf - J. Hoffmans, Institut Supérieur de Philosophie de l'Université: Louvain, 1914.
- Guillelmus Alnwick, *Quaestiones in Sententiarum libros*, [Assisi Version] Assisi, Bibl. Com. 172: 1r-106r. [partial editions, e.g., in Dumont 1987, Alliney 1993, Bassi 1993]
- Guillelmus Alnwick, *Utrum consilia euangelica includant perfectionem*, Firenze, Bibl. Med. Laur., S. Croce, Plut. XXXI, dext. 8: 80vA-82vB, 62rA-vB.
- Guillelmus Alnwick, *Utrum in maiori quantitate continua sint plures partes in potentia quam in minori*, Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Ap., Vat. lat. 6768: 89vB-95rA and Pal. lat. 1805: 6v-17r; Oxford, Bodl. Lib., Can. Misc. 226: 77vB-81vB.
- Guillelmus Alnwick, *Utrum intellectus agens sit substantia separata*, Firenze, Bibl. Med. Laur., S. Croce, Plut. XXXI, dext. 8: 79vA-80rB.
- Guillelmus Alnwick, *Utrum quaecumque sunt distincta ex natura rei sint distincta realiter*, Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Ap., Pal. lat. 1805: 112r-114v.
- Guillelmus Alnwick, *Quaestiones disputatae de esse intelligibili et de quodlibet*, ed. A. Ledoux, Typ. Collegii S. Bonaventurae: Ad Claras Aquas, Florentiae, 1937.
- Guillelmus Alnwick, *Utrum ratione naturali possit evidenter ostendi quod anima intellectiva sit forma corporis humani*, in Kuksewicz 1966.
- Guillelmus de Ockham, *Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum (reportatio)*, edd. R. Wood, G. Gál, R. Green, (Op. Theol. VII), The Franciscan Institute of St. Bonaventure University: St. Bonaventure NY, 1984.
- Johannes de Janduno, *Quaestiones in duodecim libros Metaphysicae*, Venetiis apud H. Scotum, 1553.
- Jacobus de Placentia, *Lectura cum quaestionibus super Tertium de Anima*, ed. Z. Kuksewicz, Ossolineum, Wroclaw - Varsovie - Cracovie 1967.
- Matthaeus de Eugubio, *Quaestiones De anima*, in Ghisalberti 1981.
- Matthaeus de Eugubio, *Utrum sit dare intellectum agentem vel propter quid ponatur, si ponitur*, in Kuksewicz 1965: 296-306.
- Thaddaeus de Parma, *Quaestiones in librum De anima*, in Vanni Rovighi 1951.
- Thaddaeus de Parma, *Utrum genus predicetur per se de differentia*, Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Ap., Vat. lat. 6768, ff. 230vB-233rB.

Secondary Literature

- Alichniewicz, Anna. 1986. "Matthew of Gubio's 'Commentary on De anima' and its Date". *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 28: 21-25.
- Alichniewicz, Anna. 1992. "Le problème de l'influence des critiques de Guillaume d'Alnwick sur l'averroïsme à Bologne". *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 31: 39-41.
- Alliney, Guido. 1993. "E' necessario amare Dio? Una questione inedita di Guglielmo di Alnwick sulla fruizione beatifica"; in Alliney - Cova 1993: 87-112.
- Alliney, Guido - Cova, Luciano (edd.). 1993. *Parva Mediaevalia. Studi per Maria Elena Reina*. Università degli Studi di Trieste: Trieste.
- Bassi, Mariaelisabetta. 1993. "La settima questione del Prologo del Commento alle Sentenze di Guglielmo di Alnwick"; in Alliney - Cova 1993: 129-156.
- Bazàn, Bernardo C. - Fransen, Gérard - Jacquart, Danielle - Wippel, John W. 1985. *Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de Théologie, de Droit et de Médecine*. Brepols: Turnhout.
- Bock, Friedrich. 1937. "Der Este-Prozess von 1321". *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 7: 41-111.
- Buzzetti, Dino - Ferriani, Maurizio - Tabarroni, Andrea (edd.). 1992. *L'insegnamento della logica a Bologna nel XIV secolo*. Istituto per la storia dell'Università: Bologna.
- Corsi, Giovanna - Mangione, Corrado - Mugnai, Massimo (edd.). 1989. *Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Storia della Logica, Le teorie delle modalità*, San Gimignano 5-8 dicembre 1987. Clueb: Bologna.
- De Mottoni, B. Faes - Luna, C. (1987) *Aegidii Romani Opera omnia* vol. I, 1/1: *Catalogo dei manoscritti: Città del Vaticano*. Olschki: Firenze.
- De Robertis, Teresa - Sturlese, Loris et alii. 1980. *Catalogo di Manoscritti filosofici nelle biblioteche italiane*, v. 1, Firenze, Pisa, Poppi, Rimini, Trieste, Firenze. Olschki: Firenze.
- Doucet, Victorin. 1932. "Descriptio codicis 172 bibliothecae communalis Assisensis" *Archivum franciscanum historicum* 25: 257-74, 378-89, 502-24.
- Dumont, Stephen D. 1987. "The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Fourteenth Century: John Duns Scotus and William of Alnwick". *Mediaeval Studies* 49: 1-75.
- Ebbesen, Sten. 1978. "The Sophism 'rationale est animal' by Radulphus Brito". *CIMAGL* 24: 85-120.
- Eubel, Konrad. 1898. *Bullarium Franciscanum*, V, Romae.
- Faes de Mottoni, Barbara - Luna, Concetta. 1987. *Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia*, I., *Catalogo di manoscritti (1-95)*, 1/1. Città del Vaticano, Olschki: Firenze.
- Ghisalberti, Alessandro. 1981. *Le Quaestiones de anima attribuite a Matteo da Gubbio*. Vita e Pensiero: Milano.
- Jacquart, Danielle. 1985. "La question disputée dans les facultés de Médecine"; in Bazàn - Fransen - Jacquart - Wippel 1985: 279-315.
- Knuutila, Simo - Työrinoja, Rejo - Ebbesen, Sten (edd.). 1990. *Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy*. Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy (S.I.E.P.M.), Helsinki, 24-29 August 1987, v. II. Luther-Agricola Society: Helsinki.
- Kuksewicz, Zdzislaw. 1965. *Averroïsme bolonais au XIV^e siècle. Edition des Textes*. Ossolineum: Wrocław - Varsovie - Cracovie.

- Kuksewicz, Zdzisław. 1966. "Wilhelma Alnwicka trzy kwestie antyverroistyczne o duszy intelektualnej". *Studia mediewistyczne* 7: 3-76.
- Kuksewicz, Zdzisław. 1968. *De Siger de Brabant à Jacques de Plaisance. La théorie de l'intellect chez les averroistes latins des XIII^e et XIV^e siècles*. Ossolineum: Wrocław - Varsovie - Cracovie.
- Kuksewicz, Zdzisław. 1986. "Un commentaire averroïste bolonais du XIV^e siècle sur le 'De anima'". *Studia Mediewistyczne* 24.2: 61-99
- Lambertini, Roberto. 1989a. "Resurgant entia rationis. Matthaëus de Augubio on the Object of Logic". *CIMAGL* 59: 3-60.
- Lambertini, Roberto. 1989b. "Utrum genus possit salvari in unica specie. Problemi di semantica dei termini universali tra Gentile da Cingoli e Radulphus Brito"; in Corsi - Mangione - Mugnai 1989: 283-288.
- Lambertini, Roberto. 1990. "Logic as a Science and Its Object According to Gentilis de Cingulo"; in Knuutila - Työrinoja - Ebbesen 1990: 547-557.
- Lambertini, Roberto. 1992. "La teoria delle intentiones da Gentile da Cingoli a Matteo da Gubbio. Fonti e linee di tendenza"; in Buzzetti - Ferriani - Tabarroni 1992: 277-351.
- Ledoux, Athanasius. 1937. *Praefatio to Fr. Guillelmi Alnwick O.F.M. Quaestiones disputatae de esse intelligibili et de quodlibet*, ed. A. Ledoux, Typ. Collegii S. Bonaventurae: Ad Claras Aquas, Florentiae.
- Leonardi, Claudio. 1994. "Éditions des textes". *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 36: 9-21.
- Libera, Alain de. 1996. *La querelle des universaux. De Platon à la fin du Moyen Age*. Seuil: Paris.
- Maier, Anneliese. 1944. "Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des italienischen Averroismus im 14. Jahrhundert". *Quellen und Forschungen aus ital. Archiven und Bibliotheken* 33: 136-157.
- Maier, Anneliese. 1949. "Wilhelm von Alnwicks Bologneser Quaestiones gegen den Averroismus (1323)". *Gregorianum* 30: 265-308. Rpt. in Maier 1964b: 1-40.
- Maier, Anneliese. 1955. "Die Bologneser Philosophen des 14. Jahrhunderts" *Studi e Memorie per la storia dell'Università di Bologna*, n. s. I: 297-310. Rpt. in Maier 1967: 335-349.
- Maier, Anneliese. 1964a. "Die italienischen Averroisten des Codex Vat. lat. 6768". *Manuscripta* 8: 68-82. Rpt. in Maier 1967: 351-366.
- Maier, Anneliese. 1964b. *Ausgehendes Mittelalter*, I. Edizioni di storia e letteratura: Roma.
- Maier, Anneliese. 1967. *Ausgehendes Mittelalter*, II. Edizioni di storia e letteratura: Roma.
- Maierù, Alfonso. 1992. "I commenti bolognesi ai Tractatus di Pietro Ispano"; in Buzzetti - Ferriani - Tabarroni 1992: 497-543.
- Maierù, Alfonso. 1994. *University Training in Medieval Europe*, Translated and edited by D. N. Prysds, Brill: Leiden-New York-Köln.
- Malagola, Carlo (ed.). 1888. *Statuti delle Università e dei Collegi dello studio bolognese*. Nicola Zanichelli: Bologna.
- Marmo, Costantino. 1994. *Semiotica e linguaggio nella Scolastica: Parigi, Bologna, Erfurt 1270-1330. La semiotica dei Modisti*. Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo: Roma.

- Piana, Celestino. 1948. "Nuovo contributo allo studio delle correnti dottrinali nell'Università di Bologna nel sec. XIV". *Antonianum* 23: 221-254.
- Piana, Celestino. 1970. *Chartularium Studii Bononiensis S. Francisci (saec. XIII-XVI)*. Typ. Collegii S. Bonaventurae: Ad Claras Aquas, Florentiae.
- Piana, Celestino. 1982. "Una 'Determinatio' inedita di Guglielmo Alnwick O. F. M. (†1333), come saggio di alcune fonti tacitamente usate dall'autore". *Studi Francescani* 40: 191-231.
- Piana, Celestino. 1986. "Postille al Chartularium Studii Bononiensis S. Francisci". *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 79: 78-141.
- Pinborg, Jan. 1975a. "A Note on Some Theoretical Concepts of Logic and Grammar". *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 29/113: 286-296. Rpt. in Pinborg (1984).
- Pinborg, Jan. 1975b. "Radulphus Brito's Sophism on Second Intentions". *Vivarium* 13: 119-152.
- Pinborg, Jan. 1980. "Radulphus Brito on Universals", *CIMAGL* 35: 56-142.
- Pinborg, Jan. 1984. *Medieval Semantics. Selected Studies on Medieval Logic and Grammar*. ed. S. Ebbesen. Variorum: London.
- Prezioso, Faustino A. 1962. *L'eternità aristotelica del mondo in una "quaestio" inedita di Guglielmo Alnwick (†1333)*. Cedam: Padova.
- Rossi, Pietro B. 1992. "Il commento di Matteo da Gubbio agli *Analitici secondi*"; in Buzzetti - Ferriani - Tabarroni 1992: 461-495.
- Schmugge, Ludwig. 1966. *Johannes von Jandun (1285/89-1328). Untersuchungen zur Biographie und Sozialtheorie eines lateinischen Averroisten*. Hiersemann: Stuttgart.
- Stella, Prospero T. 1968. "La sindrome della scienza nella questione 'Utrum habitus scientiae sit subiective in intellectu' di Guglielmo di Alnwick". *Orientamenti pedagogici* 15: 767-803.
- Tabarroni, Andrea. 1992. "Gentile da Cingoli e Angelo d'Arezzo sul *Peryermenias* e i maestri di logica a Bologna all'inizio del XIV secolo"; in Buzzetti - Ferriani - Tabarroni 1992: 393-440.
- Tachau, Katherine H. 1988. *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics 1250-1345*. Brill: Leiden - New York - København - Köln.
- Vanni Rovighi, Sofia. 1951. *Le quaestiones de Anima di Taddeo da Parma*, Vita e Pensiero: Milano.
- Vanni Rovighi, Sofia. 1969. "Gli averroisti bolognesi"; in: *Oriente ed Occidente nel Medioevo: filosofia e scienze*, Convegno internazionale, 9-15 aprile 1969, Accademia nazionale dei Lincei: Roma: 161-179. Rpt. in Vanni Rovighi (1978).
- Vanni Rovighi, Sofia. 1978. *Studi di filosofia medioevale*, II, *Secoli XIII e XIV*. Vita e Pensiero: Milano.
- Veliath, Dominic. 1970. "The 'Scotism' of William of Alnwick in his *Determinationes de Anima*". *Salesianum* 32: 93-134.

